IMMUNIZING THE MEDICAL PRACTITIONER
“PROCESS” INFRINGER
Greasing
the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?
Weldon
E. Havins, M.D., J.D.
“We talk on principle, but we act
on interest.”
Walter
Savage Landor (1775-1864)
“Lopez Baños and Romero Alpuente,” Imaginary Conversations,
1824-1853
Recent
changes our medical procedure patent laws have immunized only licensed medical
practitioners against medical procedure patent infringement actions.
This preferential immunity thus makes likely situations exemplified in
the following hypothetical.
At
a quiet, mostly empty restaurant, a young couple, James and Sarah, enjoy an
early Prime Rib steak dinner. Sitting
a few empty tables away, a business attired woman, Mary, enjoys her meal alone
while she reads a novel. Mary has
just completed her workday as an insurance clerk.
She dreams of becoming an insurance lawyer someday when she had saved
up enough money for law school. Mary
has a comfortable start on her savings plan but has a long way to go,
especially considering the exorbitant tuition costs of law school these days.
Mary
had recently completed a first aid class where a procedure to treat persons
with upper airway obstruction was described, but not taught.
The procedure involved the application of a sudden compression of the
upper abdomen in an upright person and was said to be very effective at
forcibly expelling objects acutely obstructing a person’s upper airway.
The instructor discussed, but did not teach, the maneuver because the
procedure had been patented. The
instructor explained that the inventor and holder of the patented medical
procedure, Dr. Hindlick,[1]
had in the past brought at least one infringement action against a person who
had used his patented procedure without his prior express approval.
Dr.
Hindlick advertised in national periodicals that he charged $1000 to use of
his patented procedure, with prior approval.
Dr. Hindlick warned in the same advertisements that he charged $5000
for any non-approved infringing use of his patented procedure.
Mary’s first aid instructor shared with his class that he had learned
from his attorney-friend that Dr. Hindlick’s medical procedure patent had
been challenged in court, and that the patent had been found valid and
enforceable. Dr. Hindlick successfully argued that he had invented the
procedure, timely filed a claim and received a Patent and Trade Office patent,
and that had he right to protect his valid patent against infringers.
The
first aid instructor informed the students that if, however, the person using
the procedure was a health care professional, the law provided immunity
against infringement actions. This exception, he reiterated, applied only to health care
professionals. If they used the
procedure, they would subject to liability for patent infringement.
In
the restaurant, James and Sarah banter away in cordial conversation.
Suddenly, to the horror of James, Sarah grasps her throat.
Her face contorts in alarm. Coughing
violently on every exhalation, she emits a high pitched screaming
stridor[2]
on each attempt to inhale. James,
panicking at Sarah’s obvious respiratory distress, screams for someone,
anyone, to help Sarah. His
desperate, beseeching eyes fall upon Mary who has looked up from her novel,
curious of the source of the commotion. Realizing
the emergency, Mary drops her novel to the floor and moves toward the now
semi-comatose Sarah who has collapsed on the floor. Mary walks past an increasingly lifeless young Sarah and
positions herself along a side wall of the room while noting, with horror,
that Sarah’s skin is turning a grayish-blue as she struggles to breathe.
Wanting to help, but recalling her first aid instructor’s admonition
about using the Hindlick maneuver, she curses the fact that she is not a
health professional, knowing that if she were, she’d have immunity against
Dr. Hindlick’s infringement ploy. Such is the dilemma our absurd contemporary law places upon
ordinary citizens; utilize a useful medical procedure and subject yourself to
an infringement action if the medical procedure is protected by a medical
process patent.
Historically,
medical and surgical procedures were not patentable.[3] For
example, in 1862, in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, a New York
Circuit Court rejected a patent on a
method of anesthetizing patients using inhalation of ether.[4]
The holding of the Court rendered clear that medical and surgical
methods of treating the human body were not patentable processes.[5]
Until 1952, the Commissioners of Patents’ propounded the rule that
“the methods or modes of treatment [by] physicians of certain diseases are
not patentable.”[6]
The PTO simply rejected any claims attempting to patent a medical
procedure.[7]
In 1952, the Patent Office Board of Appeals considered a challenge to a
patent issued for a machine which forcibly injected medication through intact
skin using a pressure jet mechanism.[8]
Unarguably, the machine claim, alone,
contained sufficient elements for patentability.[9] The
Court, however, focused on considerations of the utility of the “whole
process” of injecting medication using a pressure jet, rather than the
machine itself, and allowed a claim for a patent on the process of injection
of medication through intact skin.[10]
This ruling opened the door for medical process patents (medical
procedure patents)[11]
and since that time medical process patents have been issued.[12]
Although
rarely enforced, physicians have obtained medical process patents mainly to
claim credit for a medical procedure invention, without expectations of
royalties or other compensation.[13]
While medical process patents have been controversial since Sherer,
the debate on these patents reached a critical mass threshold in 1994 when
Samuel Pallin, an ophthalmic surgeon holding a medical process patent on a
sutureless cataract surgery incision, brought an infringement action against
Jack A. Singer, another ophthalmic surgeon using the patented incision on his
own cataract surgery patients.[14]
This
case excited heated debate over the issue of whether or not medical procedures
should be patentable, in large part, because it was the first medical process
infringement action brought by one physician against another.[15] The
proponents of medical process patents supported the patent holder, Dr. Pallin,
while the opponents sympathized with the defendant alleged infringer, Dr.
Singer. By the time the case was
resolved,[16]
a legislative melee [17]
had induced a statutory amendment “remedy.”[18]
This
paper will comment on the derivation, purpose, and effectiveness of this
legislative remedy. Part A of
this paper will discuss the legal basis for the public policy of granting
exclusive rights to use, promote, or sell an invention.
Part B will delineate the requirements for patentability, including:
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, specification requirements, and patentable
subject matter. Part B presents
some arguments favoring and disfavoring medical procedure patents.
Part D discusses the attempts at legislating a remedy for the perceived
deficiencies in the law permitting a Pallin v. Singer case.
Part E will conclude with personal observations and a call for the
United States to join the world’s other modern economic powers by rejecting
medical process patents.
PART A The
Legal Basis for Patents
Article
I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to make laws which promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.[19]
Congress subsequently promulgated patent acts in furtherance of this
power. The first was the Patent
Act of 1790,[20]
also known as the “1790 Act.” Congress
replaced this unworkable act in 1793 with a statute which provided for formal
registration of writings and inventions.[21]
Finding this system increasingly problematic Congress provided, in
1836, a formal system of granting patents from applications reviewed by
professional examiners.[22]
In 1952, Congress amended this law by clearly defining the requirements
an inventor must meet to be granted a patent.[23]
These requirements are encoded in title 35 of the United States Code.[24]
Section 101 of the code provides, in part, that “whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
Generally, to be patentable, the subject matter must be patentable[25]
and the claim must meet the requirements of novelty, utility, and
non-obviousness.[26]
PART B The
Requirements of Patentability
A
patent, the right to exclusively use, promote, sell or license one’s own
invention, is available to a person meeting all the requirements of
patentability. Among the most
important of these requirements are those of utility, novelty,
non-obviousness. The patent
application specification must contain a written description of the invention
along with the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make the use of the
invention.[27]
These specification requirements are summarized as enablement, best
mode, and written description. To
be patentable, the application must be filed in a timely manner.[28]
But “to make it through the Patent Office door”,[29]
the subject matter must be patentable. The
theme of this paper revolves around the question of whether human medical
procedures should be patentable subject matter.
1.
Utility[30]
- 35 U.S.C. section 101
A
patent is available only if the subject matter of the patent is useful.
The invention must provide some social benefit or utility and work in a
way that solves the problem it was designed to solve.
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government may not grant
a patent unless the invention has a specific social benefit.[31]
This has been interpreted to mean the invention must have practical
utility.[32]
Since
1994, the Guidelines for Examination of U.S. Patent Application for the
Utility Requirement state that if any credible utility would be apparent to
one of ordinary skill in the art, section 101 is satisfied.[33] Closely
related to utility are the section 112 specification requirements: enablement,
best mode, and written description.[34]
Section 112 requires that the patent contain an enabling disclosure
describing the mechanical steps to use, for example, the medical procedure (in
addition to a requirement that the medical procedure be recognized as operable[35]).
The best mode requirement requires the inventor to set forth the best
manner contemplated of carrying out his invention.[36] All
information necessary to practice the best mode must be disclosed.[37]
A medical procedure patent may be invalidated if the inventor
intentionally or deliberately fails, as established by clear and convincing
evidence, to disclose the best mode. Even
accidental concealment of the best mode is a basis for invalidating the
inventor’s patent if the inventor knew of the best mode and didn’t
disclose it in the specification.[38]
Those who patent a medical procedure may not reserve their own private
“trade secret” very best mode of practicing or using the invention.[39]
The
claim must state with definiteness the boundaries or scope of the utility of
the invention claimed.[40]
If the claim fails to state the scope of the invention, or claims a
broader scope than the invention justifies, the PTO is required to refuse to
grant the requested patent.[41]
If the patent has been issued and challenged, the court is required to
hold the patent invalid and inadvertently granted by the PTO.[42]
2.
Novelty
- 35 U.S.C. section
102
The
subject matter of patent - process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter -must disclose something that is new or “novel”.[43] The
patent application or claim must teach something new; that is, something which
is not available in the prior art.[44]
If the prior art itself, or an anticipation[45]
of prior art by an ordinary person skilled in the art evidences the invention,
the claim lacks novelty and is not patentable.[46]
The details of novelty, as described in section 102, are meant to
ensure that only new products and processes are patentable.[47] Section
102 also delineates circumstances under which patents will not be granted.[48]
Perhaps the most common reasons for patent denials are found in section
102(b) which provides that an invention may not be publicly used or offered
for sale in the United States, or patented or published anywhere, more than
one year prior to the date of filing the application for a U.S. patent.[49]
Whether a patent application will be denied under section 102 as prior
art will depend on considerations of the following: prior printed
publications, prior public use of the invention, prior public knowledge, prior
patent applications in the U.S., and prior invention of the subject matter of
the patent by another party.[50]
As
relates specifically to medical procedure patents, if an inventor publicly
uses the invention in the U.S., offers the invention for sale in the U.S.,
or patents or publishes the invention anywhere more than one year
before filing for a PTO patent, a patent may not be issued.[51]
A medical procedure inventor has only one year from the time he or she
offers the invention for sale, or publicly demonstrates, or uses the invention
in the U.S., to file for a patent.[52]
Filing the patent application just one day after the statutorily
permitted one year period, will result in rejection of the application, or
invalidation of the erroneously issued patent when the breach of the one year
period becomes known.[53]
A medical procedure inventor may successfully contest this strictly
construed rule if the inventor can prove that the use of the patent was for
refining the invention, or assessing the value of the invention in
consideration of the time and expense of filing an application.[54] This
“experimental use” exception may resurrect an otherwise dead claim.
3.
Non-obviousness - U.S.C.
section 103
Section
103 of 35 U.S.C. requires that the invention be non-obvious to be patentable.[55]
If prior art would make the claimed invention obvious, the invention is
not patentable.[56]
Whether an invention is patentable over the prior art depends on
whether the subject matter of the claim, taken “as a whole,” is or would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the prior art at the time
of the filing for the patent.[57]
In contrast to novelty, a patent may be denied if an invention is
obvious to one skilled in the art on the basis of more than one prior
reference.[58]
4. Patent Application Specification - 35 U.S.C. section
112
In
exchange for the grant of a patent which provides the inventor the exclusive
right to make, use, or sell his invention for a period of twenty years,[59]
the inventor must fully disclose and correctly teach the public how to make
and use his invention. This is
society’s quid pro quo for the granting the inventor the rights associated
with patenting. In practice,
patent holders generally use the patent themselves
or license the invention in exchange for royalties.[60]
The
standards for disclosure are set forth in section 112 of the U.S.C. in the
descriptive portion of the patent application known as the specification.[61]
The specification must contain a written description of the invention
that enables an ordinary person skilled in the prior art to make and use the
invention.[62]
Moreover, the specification must describe the best mode of making and
using the invention contemplated by the inventor at the time of filing the
application.[63]
The patent applicant must disclose the invention fully, including any
specific techniques or characteristics for best putting the invention into
practice.[64]
The
requirement of definiteness of the claim delimits the boundaries or scope of
the inventor’s patent rights.[65]
When a applicant fails to satisfactorily apprise the person of ordinary
skill in the art of the scope of the invention, or where the applicant’s
claim is broader in scope than is justified by the invention, the PTO is
mandated to reject the patent application.[66]
If the PTO inadvertently grants the patent, the courts are required to
invalidate the patent.[67]
5.
Subject matter patentability -
Process
In
order to be patentable, the invention must be either a process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or an improvement thereof.[68]
Patents are generally divided into product or process patents.
The term “process” means a process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.[69]
A process differs from other classes of subject matter in that it does
not constitute an entity, but rather consists of a step or series of steps
designed to lead to a useful result.[70]
Under this broadly worded text, a medical procedure, just like any
other invention, may receive a patent as long as the medical procedure
satisfies the statutory requirements. In
upholding a patent on genetically engineered bacteria, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the patent laws would be given wide scope[71],
and quoted Congressional committee reports demonstrating that Congress
intended patentable subject matter to include “anything under the sun made
by man.”[72]
Thus, the term “process” reasonably includes medical procedures.[73]
PART C Reasons
Favoring and Disfavoring Medical Process Patents
Proponents
of medical process patents tend to center their arguments on economic bases.[74]
Perhaps the strongest economic argument supporting medical process
patents springs from the “incentive to invent” theory.[75]
Medical process patents encourage invention by hedging the risk of
private investment.[76]
In the absence of medical process patent protection, the argument goes,
investors would lack an economic incentive to fund costly clinical research.[77]
Patent protection ensures that inventors’ profit by providing
exclusive license fees and royalties.[78]
This argument seems problematic in the face of the lack of reliable
empirical data establishing that the patent system promotes the development of
science and technology.[79]
At the least, this theory would apply only to medical processes
requiring extensive clinical research. It
is difficult to imagine how this argument would apply to so-called “pure”
medical processes[80]
which do not require significant capital to develop.
The
second economic rationale for patenting medical procedures comes from the
“incentive to disclose” theory.[81]
This theory argues that, in the absence of patent protection, nothing
requires inventors to publish, explain, teach, or otherwise disseminate their
work.[82]
Disclosure is essential for the efficient development of science and
technology because its publication requirement in the patent process prevents
wasteful duplicative research.[83]
Without the disclosure requirement, this theory posits that a medical
practitioner would likely withhold his new medical procedure from the public
in pursuit of a self-created monopoly.[84]
But isn’t the exact same risk created when the medical practitioner
receives a patent and demands exorbitant licensing fees?
The main difference, apparently, is that the patent holder is granted a
monopoly for twenty years. Absent
the fear of infringing a patent, it seems very likely that another
practitioner would develop the same or a similar medical procedure.
Then, another practitioner would likely develop a further improvement
in the medical procedure and promote it to his or her credit.
Thus, keeping a non-patented medical procedure secret in this system
would only benefit a physician-inventor for a very short time.
A
third economic advantage of medical process patents comes from the
“incentive to innovate” theory.[85]
A doctor-patent holder has an interest in assuring the safety and long
term success of the procedure since his profits will thereby be maximized by
extended licenses and royalty contracts.[86]
Therefore, medical process patents should be available to further
development by the patent holder.
The
ethical arguments opposing patenting medical processes involve restricted
access to medical procedures and the adverse effects of patented processes on
a medical practitioner’s judgment. Medical
process patents may limit or eliminate a patient’s access to new medical
procedures. Patentees may charge
any price for a license or royalty contract.[87]
Conceivably, a very useful new medical procedure could be excluded from
the market, or be made available on an extremely limited and expensive basis
for twenty years. If restricted
in its availability, a clearly superior medical procedure could nevertheless
become the standard of care for treatment of a particular condition.
Medical practitioners would be compelled to pay the demanded price or
risk being subject to a medical malpractice liability claim for breach of the
duty to practice at the level of the standard of care.
Using the medical procedure without paying would subject the medical
practitioner to an infringement action.
Similarly,
patenting medical procedures may affect a medical practitioner’s judgment in
using a patented procedure.[88]
If the medical practitioner has paid the price for the right to use the
procedure, will he or she use it (when it may not be the best current
procedure) just to recover the costs of the investment?
Will the practitioner not use the procedure because he or she hadn’t
paid for the right to use it and use an inferior procedure which has not been
subject to a patent? Will a
practitioner avoid using what may be the best procedure simply because he or
she doesn’t know if the procedure is patented, and he or she wants to avoid
an infringement lawsuit?
In
1995, when Congress attempted legislative relief of medical process patents
controversy, these questions and arguments were raised.
Was it the economic arguments that appeared sufficiently persuasive to
defeat several bills, or was the legislative agenda controlled by other
considerations? An abbreviated
review of pertinent legislative history follows.
PART D Legislative
Sausage - the Medical Process Patent Amendment
In
March of 1995, Representative Ganske introduced the Medical Procedure
Innovation and Affordability Act, H.R. 1127.[89]
The bill proposed to prohibit the issuance of patents “for any
invention of a method or process for performing a surgical or medical
procedure, administering a surgical or medical therapy, or making a medical
diagnosis.”[90]
Excepted from the prohibition were patents issued for techniques,
methods, or processes performed as a necessary component of a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.[91]
Organized medicine supported this bill; the ABA and the biotechnology
industry opposed this bill, criticizing the bill as vague and overly broad
because it did not define the meaning of “surgical or medical procedure,
surgical or medical therapy, or making a diagnosis.”[92]
The biomedical industry, which relies on patents to protect their
investments in developing products, expressed concern about the lack of
definition of “medical therapy,” which they believed might have threatened
their industry.[93]
Another criticism leveled at the bill was that doctors would be
compelled to deceive the PTO by keeping secret the inventive aspect of a
discovery by obtaining a patent for an instrument capable of performing the
medical procedure.[94]
These
criticisms defy reason. The
biotechnology industry simply could have offered an amendment to define
“medical therapy” so that their capital investments would not be
threatened. Second, a
doctor-inventor patenting an instrument and the integral medical process
critical to the utility of that instrument would be granted patent protection
because the bill excepted medical processes essential to the utility of the
patented product. Hence, there
would not be a motive to maintain secret information regarding the use of the
instrument.
The
Clinton administration testified on H.R. 1127 declaring that excluding
surgical and medical procedures from patentability was not the proper way to
address the concerns surrounding medical patents.[95]
The Clinton administration neither limited their comments to medical
“process” patents, nor suggested how their concerns related to medical
procedure patents.[96]
The Administration’s comments appear to be without substance, but
supportive of the ABA’s opposition to the bill.
The
executive director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association
testified that “there was no need for the legislation.”[97] Dr.
Kirk dismissed the bill with the sweeping conclusion that, the “underlying
concepts of H.R. 1127 [were] so failing in merit that all of the technical
problems [were] not worth addressing.”[98] One
could infer that Dr. Kirk’s disdain of H.R. 1127 was so great that the bill
did not deserve the dignity of a rational comment.
Mr.
Baldino, the biotechnology industry lobbyist, finally argued that the bill
would be detrimental to biotechnology firms because it would eliminate the
incentive to develop new uses for available products.[99] This
argument seems particularly spurious because new uses of patented products
would promote greater sales of the protected products, thereby benefitting the
biotechnology industry patent holders. If
anything, the non-availability of medical process patents proposed by H.R.
1127 would likely encourage creative medical practitioners to find additional
uses for the patented product because there would be no apprehension of an
infringement action. The notion
that these companies wish to retain the rights to bring infringement actions
against those who find new uses for patented products seems short-sighted and
against self-interest.
During
the sessions final House debates, Representative Ganske offered an amendment
to H.R. 1127 in the form of an
amendment to appropriations bill, H.R. 3814.[100] This
bill contained the same essential features as H.R. 1127, but instead defined
surgical procedure as a “treatment for curing or preventing disease, injury,
illness, disorder, or deformity by operative methods, in which human tissue is
cut, burned, or vaporized by the use of any mechanical means, laser, or
ionizing radiation, or the penetration of the skin or body orifice by any
means.”[101]
H.R. 3814 defined a medical procedure as a “nonsurgical,
nondiagnostic procedure for curing or preventing a disease, injury, illness,
disorder, or deformity.”[102]
The bill made two exceptions to the prohibited issuance of medical
process patents. The first exception was for a procedure performed by or as a necessary
component of a patentable machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.[103]
The second exception was for "a new use of a composition of matter
or biotechnological process."[104]
This bill should have satisfied the concerns of the biotechnology
industry regarding H.R. 1127.[105]
Representative Ganske’s testimony in support of the bill enumerated
reasons for restricting medical process patents:
1.
Patient access to new surgical and medical procedure was being
threatened by
medical patents.
2.
Medical patents permit patent owners to charge monopoly prices and
contribute to our Nation’s health care costs.
3.
Physicians have an obligation to share their knowledge and skill for
the benefit
of humanity.
4.
Medical patents are not necessary for the advancement of medicine.
5.
Europe, Canada, indeed 80 countries around the world already prohibit
medical patents.[106]
Further,
Representative Ganske specifically stated that this bill would not prohibit
patents on gene therapy or other similar procedures.[107] The
biotechnology industry nevertheless opposed the bill, claiming it would
undermine the patenting of gene therapy treatments.[108]
Unfortunately,
H.R. 3814 contained a fatal flaw. H.R.
3814 would operate by eliminating PTO funding for issuance of medical process
patents, but only for one year.[109]
Not purporting to solve the underlying medical process patent
controversy, H.R. 3814 passed the House, but died in the Senate.
When
H.R. 1127 appeared moribund, Senator Bill Frist, a thoracic surgeon,
introduced S. 1334, entitled the “Medical Procedures Innovation and
Affordability Act,” which neither limited the issuance of medical procedure
patents nor restricted funding for the granting of such patents.[110]
S. 1334 would have operated by creating an infringement liability
exception for medical professionals using patented medical procedures.[111]
S. 1334 was appropriately attacked as providing physicians special
rights not available to the general public.[112]
Ultimately, S. 1334 did not pass.
A similar bill introduced by Senator Frist on September 24, 1996, S.
2105,[113]
likewise died before making it to the House.[114]
However,
the substantive portion of S. 2105 became incorporated into H.R. 3610 as
section 616[115]
of that bill.[116] During
an all-night session of the House, H.R.3610
passed out of the House without ever having had a committee hearing.[117]
Linked to H.R. 4278 as a conference report, voting out H.R. 3610
obliged the Senate to vote on the bill package without amendment.[118] On
September 30, the Senate passed H.R. 4278, containing the provisions of H.R.
3610 which was, essentially, a copy of the now defunct S. 2105.[119]
The President signed the bill that same evening creating an amendment
to 35 U.S.C. section 287(c).[120]
This section of the patent law deprives owners of medical process
patents of the right to sue for damages or seek injunctive relief when their
patents are infringed by licensed medical practitioners engaging in medical
activities.[121]
PART E Conclusion
Amending
section 287(c) greased organized medicine’s squeaky wheel.
Section 287(c) statutorily immunized licensed medical practitioners
from infringement of medical process patents.
Section 287(c) did not affect the biotechnology industry because the
patenting of medical processes survived unmolested.
The patent attorneys’ financial outlook seems even brighter since
real or imagined ambiguities of 287(c) will be litigated for years to come.
But
in an overall sense, all this legislative maneuvering amounted to “much ado
about nothing.” Section 287(c)
merely formalized the status quo in existence prior to the Pallin v. Singer
infringement action. Prior to Pallin, medical practitioners did not sue one
another for patent infringement. Section
287(c) merely statutorily recognizes that gentlemen’s understanding.
Are
there any real losers from this legislation?
Remember our hypothetical choking Sarah from the beginning of this
paper? She died.
Not being a 287(c) immunized licensed medical practitioner, Mary feared
an infringement action from Dr. Hindlick if she used his patented medical
procedure to help Sarah.
Let’s
take another no so hypothetical example.
Many air carriers have purchased portable automatic cardiac
defibrillators which are intended to be used by their flight attendants when a
passenger has a suspected heart attack. Surely
the cardiac defibrillators are patented.
Is the medical process of placing the defibrillator on
a heart attack victim or the medical process associated with the
operation of the defibrillator patented?
If so, is the non-medical practitioner operator of the portable
defibrillator going to be subject to an infringement action?
It is ridiculous that non-medical practitioner thrust into this
situation should be concerned with the possibility of an infringement lawsuit.
Why
then, doesn’t 287(c) apply to all citizens, rather than just licensed
medical practitioners? Because
“all citizens” weren’t squeaking at Congress.
Section 287(c) merely quieted (greased) the squeaking licensed medical
practitioners!
Too
bad Sarah didn’t choke in a restaurant in Canada or Great Britain.
Neither of these countries allow medical method patents.[122]
Mary would have been free to use Dr. Hindlick’s patented medical
procedure without fear of infringement litigation.
In
addition to Canada and Great Britain, virtually all other GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) countries and NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) member countries[123]
exclude patentability of diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals.[124]
Additionally, the European Community generally prohibits medical process
patents.[125]
Evidently, the (bogus) concerns expressed by the American biotechnology
industry are not shared by a multitude of other countries.
Shouldn’t
American citizens who are not licensed medical practitioners enjoy the same
privileges as citizens in those countries?
Isn’t it time for us to join the other enlightened countries in the
modern world and prohibit medical process patents?
[1]
Dr. Hindlick is a hypothetical inventor of a medical procedure,
requiring no product, which is useful to clear acute airway obstructions in
humans.
[2]
Stridor is a harsh vibrating sound heard during respiration in cases
of obstruction of the air passages. Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary, 664
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield Mass., (1995).
[3]
See Donald S. Chisum, Patents:
A Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity and Infringement, §
1.03(3), 1-70, (1996).
[4]
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 Fed. Cas. 879, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1862).
[5]
Donald S. Chisum, 1 Patents § 1.03[3] (1995).
[6]
Id.
[7]
Wendy W. Yang, Patent Policy and Medical Patents: Case for Statutory
Exclusion from Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci.
& Tech. L. 5 (1985). Medical
procedure claims are referred to in patent language as medical “process”
patents. Id.
[8]
Becton-Dickinson v. Scherer, 106 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Mich. 1952)
(where the court held that processes are patentable even if they consist of
medical or surgical methods which involve treatment of the human body).
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
For the purposes of clarity, in the language of the U.S. Code, Title
35, a patent on a medical procedure is legally characterized as a patent on
a medical process. Thus, the
legal term “medical process” patent is equivalent to the more
generically understood term “medical procedure” patent.
35 U.S.C.A. § 100.
[12]
Susan H. Adelman, An Earful About Why Lawyers Support Process
Patents, 38 Amer. Med. News 34,
35-36 (1995).
[13]
Reid G. Adler & Kate H. Murashige, Biomedical Product Patent
Protection Essential to High Tech Economy, Legal
Backgrounder, Feb. 2, 1996 (in Lexis news library, WLF file).
[14]
Pallin V. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995).
See also, U.S. Court in Vermont Declares Patent Claims on Surgical
Procedure Invalid and Unenforceable, AHLA
Health Law Digest, 1-2, West Group ed. (1998).
[15]
Lee Bowman, Physicians Stake
Claims to the Art of Healing: Courts will rule on Patents, While Medial
Societies Denounce Them an Unethical, Harmful, S.F. Examiner, July
16, 1995, at B-1.
[16]
Pallin v. Singer, 1996 W.L. 274407 (D. Vt.)(where, via consent
decree, the action was dismissed with prejudice and all patent claims were
declared invalid). Was the PTO
in error in issuing the patent? A
PTO rejection of Pallin’s
claim would appear to have avoided the wrenching controversy that ensued.
[17]
The following bills (to be discussed insubstantial detail) were
introduced to remedy the concerns generated by Pallin v. Singer:
H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3814, 104th
Cong. (1996); S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995); and S. 2105, 104th
Cong. (1996). As result of H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 104-863 (1995), the statutory amendment to 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) were codified from Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
[18]
H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996) and codified in 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) stating, inter alia, that, “with respect to a medical
practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that constitutes an
infringement ...[an action for infringement]... shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to
such medical activity. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) further defines the term “medical
activity” to mean “performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a
body, but does not include the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent.”
This would appear to mean, in abridged language, that a medical
practitioner is liable for infringement when the medical activity involves a
patented product.
[19]
U.S. Const., Art. I § 8, cl. 8 (1789).
[20]
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790).
[21]
See generally, Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
Patent Standards, Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal.
L. Rev. 803 (1988).
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id.
[24]
35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100 et. seq. (West 1992 and Pocket Parts 1998).
[25]
1952 Patent Act Committee Reports per Nancy Vensko, Biotechnology Law
class (1999).
[26]
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (West
Supp. 1998).
[27]
35 U.S.C. § 112 (West Supp. 1998).
[28]
U.S.C. § 102 (generally providing a one year period from the time of
reduction to practice to file an application with the Patent and Trade
Office).
[29]
S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952) (wherein both the Senate and House Committee
Reports intended patentable subject matter under section 101 to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man....”).
Id.
[30]
35 U.S.C. § 101.
[31]
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1966) (holding that, unless
the invention is developed to the point of specific benefit in its current
form, the patent should not be issued).
[32]
Id.
[33]
Guidelines for Examination of U.S. Patent Applications for the
Utility Requirement, USD Biotechnology Class syllabus, MPEP § 706.03
[A][1].
[34]
35 U.S.C. § 112.
[35]
Operability in section 112 has the same meaning as utility in section
101; that is, practical usefulness. See
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569 (1995).
The statute requires that the medical procedure works in a way to
solve the problem it was designed to solve; there is no requirement to
explain how or why the medical procedure works.
Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 36 at 147 (1992).
[36]
35 U.S.C. § 112
[37]
Id.
[38]
Brian P. O’Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genius: Developing a
New Approach for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the
Unpredictable Arts, 7 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Medic & Ent. L. J. 147, 160 (1996).
[39]
Id.
[40]
A claim is an introductory, one sentence statement of the definition
of the invention for which patent rights are requested.
See generally, John W. Schlicher, Patent Law: Legal and
Economic Principles § 7.02.
[41]
John W. Schlicher, Patent Law: Legal and Economic Principles
§ 7.02 (1)(a) (1996).
[42]
Id.
[43]
See generally, Herbert Schwartz, Patent Law & Practice,
48-74 (2nd ed. 1995) (generally excellent discussion of the
requirements of patentability).
[44]
See generally, In re Baxter Travenol Labs, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281
(1991).
[45]
Id. The section
102 novelty requirement is not met if the invention is anticipated.
That is, if all the elements of the claim are identically disclosed
in a single prior art reference, there is no novelty and the application
must fail. If the patent has
been issued, the patent may be challenged on the basis of anticipation. If anticipation is established by a preponderance of
objective evidence presented by those skilled in the art, the patent will be
invalidated.
[46]
Id.
[47]
Id.
[48]
35 U.S.C. § 102.
[49]
35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
[50]
Id.
[51]
Id.
[52]
Id.
[53]
See Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290
(1992).
[54]
Id.
[55]
35 U.S.C. § 103.
[56]
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (wherein the
Supreme Court elucidated a four step test to determine the obviousness or
non-obviousness of a claimed invention:
i.
determine the scope and content of the prior art;
ii.
ascertain the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art;
iii.
resolve the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art; and
iv. determine the obviousness of the subject matter against the
background of the first three steps.
[57]
Gore v. Garlock, 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a
claim must be evaluated “as a whole” when determining non-obviousness or
obviousness under section 103).
[58]
Herbert Schwartz, Patent Law & Practice at 60 (2nd ed.
1995) (detailing prior art to include:(1) printed publications or patents
from anywhere in the world that were published or
issued before the applicant's date of invention,
(2) prior
use/knowledge occurring in the U. S. before the invention date,
(3) a
United States patent application that subsequently issued and was filed
before the applicant's date of invention, and
(4) another's invention made in
the United States and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed before the
invention date of the invention in question.
[59]
35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West Supp. 1998).
[60]
35 U.S.C. § 261.
[61]
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1.
[62]
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398,
1404 (1997); Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1966 (1997).
[63]
Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1036
(1990) (wherein Court stated that all information necessary to practice the
best mode, whether characterized as manufacturing data, customer
requirements, or trade secrets, must be disclosed).
See also, Scripps Clinic v. Genetech, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1002, 1012 (1991).
[64]
Chemcast, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036-37.
[65]
Robert P. Merges, Patent
Law and Policy 39 at 516.
[66]
John W. Schlicher, Patent Law: Legal and Economic Principles §
7.01(1)(a).
[67]
Id.
[68]
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
[69]
35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
[70]
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (wherein the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that a process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to
produce a given result. It is
an act or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.).
[71]
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
[72]
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 5 (1952); and H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., at 6
(1952)).
[73]
35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
[74]
Beata Gocyk-Farber, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a
Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1527, 1537 (1997).
[75]
Brian McCormmick, Restricting Patents: Bipartisan Bill Would Bar
Ownership Claims for Medical Methods, Am.
Med. News, Mar. 20, 1995, at 3; Susan Hershberg, An Earful About
Why Lawyers Support Process Patents, Am.
Med. News, Sept. 11, 1995, at 35.
[76]
Gregory R. Burch, Note, Ethical Consideration in the Patenting of
Medical Processes, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
1139 (1987).
[77]
George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of
Patenting, 14 Hastings Center Rep.
25 (1984).
[78]
Susan Hershberg, An Earful About Why Lawyers Support Process
Patents, Am. Med. News,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 37.
[79]
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1989).
[80]
Pure process patents are those that do not involve a product as a
critical element of the medical procedure.
An example of a “pure” process patent is U.S. Patent No.
4,986,274 held by Dr. John Stephens who received a patent on a method of
"reading an ultrasound image to determine the gender of a fetus in the
first trimester of pregnancy." The
procedure involves a common sense identification of male and female
genitalia: penis =male; no penis = female (not rocket science!).
So self‑evident is the process that one physician commented
that Dr. Stephens holds "a patent for telling the difference between
the right hand and the left hand."
Yet, Dr. Stephens is a patentee of the procedure and plans to
restrict its usage by limiting licenses for the next seventeen years.
Hearing on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st
Sess., at *5 (testimony of Charles D. Kelman, M.D., American Society of
Cataract and Refractive Surgery).
[81]
Id.
[82]
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law 13 (1975).
[83]
Eisenberg, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
1029.
[84]
Brian McCormick, restricting Patents: Bipartisan Bill Would Bar
Ownership Claims for Medical Methods, Amer.
Med. News, Mar. 20, 1995 at 3.
[85]
Eisenberg, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
1037.
[86]
William
D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.
Pat. & Trademark Off. Society
651, 653 (1995).
[87]
See Gregory F. Burch, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 1139 (1987) (noting that prices of licenses and royalty
contracts are not subject to governmental regulation).
[88]
Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents, 13 J.
Legal Med. 501, 507 (1992).
[89]
H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995). The Medical Procedures Innovation and
Affordability Act in pertinent part provides:
On
or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a patent may not be issued
for any invention or discovery of a technique, method, or process for
performing a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical or
medical therapy, or making a medical diagnosis, except that if the
technique, method, or process is performed by or as a necessary component of
a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or improvement thereof
which is itself patentable subject matter, the patent on such machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter may claim such technique, method, or
process.
[90]
Id.
[91]
Id.
[92]
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R.
1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 134 (1995).
[93]
Id. (see statement of Mr. Baldino).
Also see, Joel Garris, The Case for Patenting Medical
Procedures, 22 Am. J. Law &
Med. 85, 100-04 (1996).
[94]
Id. (see statement of Mr. Baldino).
[95]
Hearings on H.R. 1127 (testimony of G. Lee Skillington).
[96]
Id.
[97]
Hearings on H.R. 1127 (testimony of Dr. Kirk).
[98]
Id.
[99]
Hearings on H.R. 1127 (testimony of Mr. Baldino).
[100]
H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996).
[101]
See H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996).
See also, 142 Cong. Rec. H8030 (stating that Dr. Ganske
offered House Bill 3814).
[102]
Id.
[103]
Id.
[104]
Id.
[105]
Hearings on H.R. 1127 (testimony of Mr. Baldino).
[106]
142 Cong. Rec. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996)(statement of
Rep. Ganske).
[107]
Id.
[108]
Bill with PTO Finding and Patent Reform on Medical Procedures is
Signed in Law, Pat. Trademark &
Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 7, 1996, at D5.
If the biotechnology industry really had been concerned about the
bill’s restriction on gene therapy patents, the industry could have
offered an amendment to the bill specifying an exception for gene therapy
patents.
[109]
See H.R. 3814(a).
[110]
S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
[111]
Id.
[112]
142 Cong. Rec. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter
from Dr. Kirk of the American Intellectual Property Law Association
criticizing the physician immunity provision of S.1334).
[113]
S. 2105, 104th Cong. (1996).
[114]
142 Cong. Rec. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).
[115]
Public Law 104‑208 section 616 provides:
Section 287 of title 35,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
(c) (1) With respect to a medical practitioners's performance, of a
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271 (a) or
(b) of this title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this
title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related
health care entity with respect to such medical activity.
(2) for the purposes of
this subsection:
(A)
the term "medical activity" means the performance of a medical or
surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a
patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such
patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in
violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of
a bio‑ technology patent.
(B)
the term "medical practitioner" means any natural person who is
licensed by State to provide the medical activity described in subsection
(c) (1) or who is acting under the direction of such person in the
performance of the medical activity.
(C)
the term "related health care entity" shall mean an entity with
which a medical practitioner has a professional affiliation under which the
medical practitioner performs the medical activity, including but not
limited to nursing home, hospital, university, medical school, health
maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.
(D)
the term "professional affiliation" shall mean staff privileges,
medical staff membership, employment or contractual relationship,
partnership or ownership interest, academic appointment, or other
affiliation under which a medical practitioner provides the medical activity
on behalf of, or in association with, the health care entity.
(E)
the term "body" shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver, or a
nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly relating to
the treatment of humans.
(F)
the term "patented use of a composition of matter" does not
include a claim for a method of performing a medical or surgical procedure
on a body that recites that use of a composition of matter where the sue or
that composition of matter does not directly contribute to achievement of
the objective of the claimed method.
(G)
the term "State" shall mean any state or territory of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(3)
This subsection does not apply to the activities of any person, or employee
or agent of such person (regardless of whether such person is a tax exempt
organization under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code), who is
engaged in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition *1564 of
matter or the provision of provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory,
services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in physician's
office), where such activities are:
(A)
directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, or composition
of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services
(other than clinical laboratory services provided in a physician's office),
and
(B)
regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Public Health
Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.
(4)
This subsection shall not apply to any patent issued before the date of
enactment of this subsection.
Pub.
L. No. 104‑208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
[116]
H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996).
[117]
See 142 Cong. Rec. S11,815, at S11,816 (daily ed. Sept.30,
1996) (statement of Mr. Lott).
[118]
Id.
[119]
Id.
[120]
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
[121]
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). Section
287(c)(1) states that:
With
respect to a medical practitioner's performance, of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under Section 271 (a) or (b) of this title, the
provisions of Sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply
against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity
with respect to such medical activity.
Section
287(c)(2)(A) defines the term "medical activity" to mean
"performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body," but
does not include:
(i) the
use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in
violation of such patent,
(ii) the
practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such
patent, or
(iii) the practice of a
process in violation of a biotechnology patent.
[122]
Reginald Rhein, BIO, AMA Clash over Bill to Shield Health Pros
from Suits Over Procedures, Biotechnology
Newswatch, Nov. 20, 1995.
[123]
Beata Gocyk-Farber, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search For A
Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1527, 1565
(1997). (Countries Prohibiting
Medical Method Patents:
Europe:
European Patent Convention Countries
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Other
European Countries
Channel Islands (Jersey and Guernsey), Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Finland,
Gibraltar, Israel, Macedonia, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Vatican
City, Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)
North America:
Canada, Mexico,
South America:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland, Venezuela
Asia:
Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Singapore
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam,
Republic of Vanuatu,
Africa:
Benin, Bophuthatswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic,
Ciskei, Congo, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali Republic, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Tchad, Togo, Transkei, Uganda,
Venda
Other:
New Zealand, St. Helena, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen‑Aden,
Central
America: Barbados, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala).
[124]
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round,
vol. 31.
[125]
European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(4), 1 B.D.I.E.L.
986, as amended by Decision of the Administrative Council of the European
Patent Organization, Dec. 21, 1978.